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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of asking price on the final sale price based on a unique 
dataset of more than 30,000 transactions of single-family houses in Montreal from 2011 to 
2016. We construct different proxies for reference points, including predicted selling price, 
regional average (and median) asking price, regional average (and median) selling price, 
and assessment value, used by sellers in setting their asking prices. We explore the 
effectiveness of high-price strategy and low-price strategy based on these reference points. 
We find that higher asking prices are associated with higher selling pricing, suggesting 
buyers anchor to the asking price. Our results support the high-price strategy and reject the 
low-price strategy in both cold and hot markets, even controlling for unobserved quality. 
In addition, the anchor effect of the asking price on the final sale price does not differ 
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Housing plays a central role in the life of a typical household, selling a house is 
one of the most significant financial transactions a family can undertake. According to a 
recent Bank of Montréal Retirement Institute survey, in 2012, the value of the family house 
accounts for average 51%1 of the net worth of a typical Canadian household. In the United 
States, based on data for 2010, households placed almost one-third2 of their total assets 
into primary residences. Moreover, price-to-income ratios in 2017 show that in North 
America, residents in most of cities have to spend three to five year’s income to purchase 
a house. In Montreal, the price-to-income ratio is 6.49, indicating that people need to work 
for an average of 6.49 years to pay for a median-priced house in Montreal. In reality, the 
time it takes is longer because the price-to-income ratio does not take household expenses 
into account.  
The asking price in real estate markets is not to the same as the asking price of 
ordinary products because the buyer seldom pays the asking price for a house; instead, the 
buyer negotiates the price with the seller. For this reason, it is tempting to conclude that the 
asking price has limited impact on the selling price (Han & Strange, 2016). However, Han 
and Strange (2016) examined the role of the asking price in directing buyers and affecting 
the selling price by using novel survey data and proved that the asking price does in fact 
matter. Previous studies analyze and compare several sellers’ listing price strategies, 
including comparing the rounded-price, just-below-price, and precise-price strategies 
(Seiler & Beracha, 2013; Seiler & Cardella, 2016), as well as comparing the low-price, 
fair-price, and high-price strategies (Bucchianeri & Minson, 2013). 
                                                     
1 It is noted that the average ratio of the value of the family house to net worth of a typical Canadian household 
is given by and taken from https://www.bmo.com/pdf/mf/prospectus/en/12-
1347%20BMO%20Retirement%20Institute%20Report%20-%20Q4%20Cdn%20Oct_FINAL2.pdf. 
2 It is noted that the average ratio of the value of the family house to net worth of a US household is given by and 
taken from http://eyeonhousing.org/2013/09/housing-remains-a-key-component-of-household-wealth/  
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Why do the actual prices that customers are willing to pay depart from the real 
value of the products? Many studies suggest that buyers anchor to asking prices due to 
insufficient adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Green et 
al., 1998; Ariely et al., 2003; Simonson & Drolet, 2004). The anchoring bias in the purchase 
of residential real estate stems from two major aspects: (1) a unique house’s fair market 
value (FMV) is difficult to be accurately determined; and (2) the negotiation and bidding 
activity involve in determining the actual selling price. In the bidding process for the house, 
the selling price is anchored by the asking price through how the buyers perceive the value 
of the houses, and this anchoring effect cannot be adjusted away sufficiently even in an 
information-sufficient world (Northcraft & Neale, 1987). 
Asher and Wolinsky (1983) pointed out that the listing price is a signal of the 
product’s quality, especially for a product that shares imperfect information between the 
buyers and the sellers. The listing price of houses also expresses the quality of the houses: 
the higher the listing price, the higher the quality of the house. Because of information 
asymmetry between the seller and the buyer: usually the seller has greater knowledge on 
the house’s quality, when the buyers first notice the listing price, they evaluate the quality 
of the house based on the listing price of the house. Buyers’ confirmation bias, which is a 
common cognitive error in human behavior, pushes buyers to seek reasons that support the 
high quality they perceived from the high listing price, and finally pushes up the final sale 
price.  
Pricing strategies affect the final sale price in a hot market differently than in a 
cold market. In a hot market, housing supply is greater than housing demand, whereas in a 
cold market, housing demand exceeds housing supply. First of all, the bargaining power of 
the buyers in the negotiation also differs in the two markets: buyers have more bargaining 
power in a cold market than in a hot market. In addition, the quality of housing might differ 
in the two markets. Liu et al. (2016) found that the average house quality is higher in a cold 
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market than in a hot market. For these reasons, the way in which the asking price affects 
the selling price and the negotiation process might not be the same in the two markets. 
Since the asking price plays an important role in the negotiating process and 
impacts the final sale price (Cardella & Seiler, 2016), setting the asking price with regard 
to the listing-price strategy is crucial in housing transactions. 
The main motivation of this paper is to explore the impact of the asking price on 
the selling price and to examine different pricing strategies in both cold and hot markets. 
We follow the methodologies used in the study by Bucchianeri and Minson (2013), which 
employed U.S. data during the boom and the crisis periods from January 2005 to April 
2009. We use the Montreal data from January 2011 to December 2016 and examine 
whether and how listing strategies affect final sale prices. In addition, we extend 
Bucchianeri and Minson (2013) by separately examining the anchor effect of asking price 
in cold markets and in hot markets by dividing our sample into three market groups: the 
hot market (seller’s market), the cold market (buyer’s market), and the balanced market. 
We examine the anchor effect of the asking price on the selling price in each subgroup 
separately and test whether the asking price’s anchor effect differs between in cold markets 
and hot markets.  
To classify the entire sample into three market types, we apply a commonly used 
criterion, months of inventory (MOI)1, which is the ratio of the number of active listings to 
the number of sales transactions in each municipality in a certain month. A hot market 
(seller’s market) is defined as having MOI under 4 months; a balanced market is defined 
as having MOI between 4 and 6 months; a cold market (buyer’s market) is defined as 
having MOI over 6 months. It means that a given region could be classified as a hot market 
in a given month but a cold market in another month. For example, in December 2016, the 
                                                     




house market in Dollard-Des Ormeaux is a hot market because in that region, the MOI in 
December 2016 is 2.94 months, which is less than 4 months. In addition, instead of 
classifying the asking price to five levels in the study of Bucchianeri and Minson (2013), 
we extend the asking price level to nine levels. Therefore, we can clearly examine the 
change of anchor effect of the asking price on the final sale price with the increase and 
decrease in the listing price level. For example, we can test how the high asking price 
affects the final sale price, and whether the relationship between the asking price and the 
additional increase in the selling price stays linear. 
There are two major findings. First, we find that the asking price anchor the final 
sale price. Our results support the high-price strategy and reject the low-price strategy as 
there is a positive relation between the asking price level, relative to a reference price, and 
the final sale price. The high-price strategy recommends the seller to set a high listing price 
because a high listing price anchors the buyers to believe that the house has high quality, 
and then pushes the final sale price up. The low-price strategy recommends the seller to set 
a low listing price because a low listing price attracts more bidders and generates a bidding 
war, and then push the final sale price up. The results are robust to different proxies for 
reference prices, subsamples, and model specifications. The results are also consistent 
when we control for unobserved quality based on a subsample of repeat sales.   
Second, we find that there is no difference between the two pricing strategies in 
cold or hot markets. The low-price strategy works virtually the same in a hot market as in 
a cold market. In other words, sellers are not likely to induce a bidding war by asking for 
a low price in a hot market. Moreover, when sellers evaluate their houses 25% lower than 
the regional average or median asking price, they incur a greater penalty by using the low-
price strategy in a cold market than in a hot market as there is less increase in selling price 
in a cold market than in a hot market.  
To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first study using Canadian data to 
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separately analyze listing-price strategies in cold markets and in hot markets. This thesis 
contributes to the literature in two aspects: (1) the negotiations between buyers and sellers 
(Ku et al., 2006; Ku et al., 2011), and (2) anchoring behavior and its impact on final 
transaction price (Bucchianeri & Minson, 2013).  
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous 
literature on listing price strategies; Section 3 proposes the hypotheses; Section 4 
introduces the methodology; Section 5 describes the data sources and summaries the 
statistics; Section 6 presents and discusses the results and findings; Section 7 addresses the 
robustness check; and Section 8 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review on Listing-price Strategies 
The literature review focuses on representative works in listing-price strategies and 
the effectiveness of each strategy in previous studies. 
Ku et al (2006) recommended the low-price strategy, which proposes that a low 
asking price pushes the final selling price high for three reasons: (1) the low-price strategy 
lowers barriers to entry, therefore generating traffic and a bidding war; (2) the sunken costs 
from the early bidding action entices the bidders to continue to bid; and (3) the traffic 
generated by the low asking price activates the auction and attracts more bidders. The 
authors used a sample from eBay to study how and why a low starting price ends up with 
a high selling price and to confirm the auction behavior among the buyers. However, the 
effectiveness of the low-price strategy in the housing market and in the eBay case is not 
identical because unlike most products on eBay, the quality of a house is hard to be 
accessed by buyers, and the information of a house is not fairly shared between the buyer 
and the seller. Moreover, even the transaction on eBay involves a bidding process, the value 
of most products is much less than the value of the house: housing transaction is one of the 
most significant transactions that a family can undertake. Therefore, the low-price strategy 
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approved in the eBay case may not be effective in the housing market. In contrast, Ku et 
al. (2011) rejected the power of the high starting price’s anchor effect, and conclude that 
an extremely high starting price ends up with nothing because it runs the risk of locking 
buyers in and frightening them away, even though high asking prices can anchor the buyers 
and push up the selling price. 
Analyzing 385,175 unique residential sales transactions in the Hampton Roads, 
Virginia, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) from January 1993 to September 2011, 
Seiler and Beracha (2013) recommended “just below” pricing in both a seller’s market (hot 
market) and a buyer’s market (cold market). They pointed out that the “just below” pricing 
strategy generates greater net yields (the benefit minus discount associated with the 
strategy) than precise pricing and round pricing strategies. However, based on the same 
dataset, Seiler and Cardella (2016) classified pricing strategies into round pricing, “just 
below” pricing, low precise pricing, and high precise pricing, and recommended the high 
precise pricing strategy. They believed that the high precise pricing strategy generates the 
highest final selling price, the smallest negotiated discount, and the greatest surplus to the 
sellers. 
Bucchianeri and Minson (2013) analyzed 14,616 completed records of single-
family home sales in Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania from January 2005 to April 
2009, controlling for unobservable quality by using repeat-sale data from 1988 to 2004. 
They tested the initial asking price’s anchor effects by examining the interaction terms of 
the predicted selling price and the underpricing and overpricing dummies. They found that 
for each unit of increase in the predicted selling price, overpriced houses receive additional 
increases in the final sale price, confirming the effectiveness of the initial asking price’s 
anchor effects. They concluded that setting the initial asking price 10% to 20% over the 
house’s predicted market price leads to a $117 to $163 increase in the selling price, 
controlling for listing time, unobservable quality, listing offices, zip code, and school 
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district. In addition, they pointed out that even in hot markets, there is no evidence to 
support the viability of the low-price strategy because all the coefficients for the 
underpricing dummies are negative, indicating that underpriced houses receive less 
increase than do fairly priced houses for each unit of increase in the predicted selling price.  
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
3.1 The Effect of Asking Price on Final Sale Price 
We assume that the asking price acts as the anchor for the buyers: the higher the 
asking price, the higher the selling price for the houses, even though many professional 
real estate agents and numerous studies in the previous literature support the low-price 
strategy, which is backed by the buyers’ herding behavior. Buyers’ confirmation bias in 
their cognitive process drives them to seek reasons for the high price and, finally, pushes 
up the selling price. Moreover, since the residential property is not identical to the ordinary 
goods in the retail market (Han & Strange, 2016), the low-price strategy is not effective in 
attracting more bidders and causing a bidding war in our sample. In regression analysis, 
we expect the coefficients for the overpricing dummies in our main regressions to be 
significantly positive but the coefficients for the underpricing dummies in our main 
regressions to be significantly negative. 
3.2 The Effect of Asking Price on Final Sale Price in Cold and Hot Markets 
Buyers and sellers might behave differently in cold markets than in hot markets. In 
a cold market, buyers have more bargaining power over negotiations because there is more 
housing supply than demand; however, in a hot market, the lack of house inventory 
increases the probability that sellers will receive multiple offers on each house, increasing 
the sellers’ negotiating power. Although we presume that the high-price strategy works in 
both cold and hot markets, we expect that the anchor effect is different in each market 
because in a hot market, the sellers, who have less concern about overpricing their houses, 
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have more bargaining power than the buyers. Therefore, in regression analysis, we expect 
that the coefficients of the overpricing dummies will be significantly different for each 
market. 
3.3 Observable and Unobservable Quality 
It is noted that our results could be driven by housing quality, observable and 
unobservable. For example, the positive relation between the asking price and the selling 
price could simply be because the high-priced houses are of higher quality. We control for 
the observable quality through a first-stage hedonic model. For the unobservable quality, 
we conduct robustness tests by using a sample of repeat sales and including the residual 
terms from the previous sales. We expect that asking prices still play an important role in 
explaining final sale prices. In addition, if part of the asking price’s anchor power we detect 
in the main regressions is due to the unobservable quality, we expect to find, based on the 
repeat sale sample, the same direction but with smaller magnitudes for coefficients of the 
overpricing dummies and the underpricing dummies in our entire sample, and in both hot 
and cold markets. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Stage 1: Predicted Selling Price Based on the Hedonic Regression Model  
We run a hedonic regression model for all the sold houses in the entire sample: we 
regress the natural log of a house’s selling price on the house’s property characteristics. 
𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + ℎ𝑛 × 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 
 (𝐹𝑆, 𝐿𝐴, 𝐻𝐴, #𝑅, #𝐵𝑒𝑑, #𝐵𝑒𝑑𝐵, #𝐵𝑎𝑡ℎ, #𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑑𝑒𝑟, #𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, #𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡, #𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦) 
+ℎ𝑚 × 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 (𝐷_𝐹𝐴, 𝐷_𝐹, 𝐷_𝑆𝑃) 
+𝐹𝑏𝑡 + 𝐹𝑝𝑡 + 𝐹𝑦 + 𝐹𝑚 + 𝐹𝑐 + 𝜑𝑖𝑐𝑡                                                                             (1) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑠  represents the natural log of the selling price of the houses 𝑖 located in 
city 𝑐  in month 𝑡 , 
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𝐹𝑆, 𝐿𝐴, 𝐻𝐴, #𝑅, #𝐵𝑒𝑑, #𝐵𝑒𝑑𝐵, #𝐵𝑎𝑡ℎ, #𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑑𝑒𝑟, #𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, #𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡,and #𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦 
refer to the floor size, the lot area, the house’s age, the total number of rooms, the number 
of bedrooms, the number of bedrooms in the basement, the number of bathrooms, the 
number of powder rooms, the number of garages, the number of carports, and the number 
of driveways, respectively. 𝐷_𝐹𝐴, 𝐷_𝐹,  and 𝐷_𝑆𝑃 stand for the dummies for the central 
air conditioner, the fireplace, and the swimming pool. 𝐹𝑏𝑡, 𝐹𝑝𝑡, 𝐹𝑦, 𝐹𝑚,   and 𝐹𝑐 are the 
fixed effects of five building types (attached, attached corner unit, semi-detached, detached, 
and quadrex), the five property types (bungalow, mobile home, one-and-a-half storey, two 
or more storey, and split-level), the 34 municipalities in Montreal, and the time effects of 
the year and the month. 𝜑𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the residual terms of the houses 𝑖 located in city 𝑐 at 
time 𝑡. 
4.2 Stage 2: The Effect of Asking Price on Final Sale Price  
We run regressions of the log of the selling price on the log of the predicted price 
from the previous hedonic regression model, the listing time by number of months, 
dummies of price difference between the asking price and estimated sale price, and various 
fixed effects for listing offices and quarter and municipal interactions. We control for the 
listing time on the market because of the positive correlation between the listing time and 
the asking price. In the following regression, we examine that with the identical listing time 
on the market, whether overpriced houses and underpriced houses receive additional 
increases in the final sale price for each unit increase in the real value of the house. We 
construct several proxies for estimated sale price, including (1) the predicted selling price 
given by the hedonic regression model, (2) the average (median) asking price in the same 
region in the same month when the sales transaction was completed, and (3) the average 





𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
ℎ + 𝛽2 × 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
ℎ × 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛿𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
ℎ
× 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑙 + 𝐹𝑐𝑞 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡                                          (2) 
where 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 are defined as below: 
𝑂𝐷1 = 1, 𝑖𝑓 1.05 < 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑏⁄ ≤ 1.15, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑂𝐷1  = 0; 
𝑂𝐷2 = 1, 𝑖𝑓 1.15 < 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑏⁄ ≤ 1.25, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑂𝐷2  = 0; 
𝑂𝐷3 = 1, 𝑖𝑓 1.25 < 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑏⁄ ≤ 1.50, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑂𝐷3  = 0; 
𝑂𝐷4 = 1, 𝑖𝑓 1.50 < 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑏⁄ ≤ 2.00, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑂𝐷4  = 0; and 
𝑂𝐷5 = 1, 𝑖𝑓 2.00 < 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑏⁄ .  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑂𝐷5  = 0.              
We define fair pricing as our base:  
 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 0.95 < 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑏⁄ < 1.05. 
And, we define our 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠: 
𝑈𝐷1 = 1   𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑏⁄ ≤ 0.75, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑈𝐷1 = 0;              
𝑈𝐷2 = 1   𝑖𝑓 0.75 < 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑏⁄ ≤ 0.85, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑈𝐷2 = 0; and 
𝑈𝐷3 = 1   𝑖𝑓 0.85 < 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑎 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑏⁄ ≤ 0.95, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑈𝐷3 = 0. 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑠  represents the natural log of the selling price of houses 𝑖 located in city 
𝑐 in month 𝑡; 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
ℎ , 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝐹𝑙, and 𝐹𝑐𝑞 refer to the log of the predicted selling price 
from the hedonic regression model, the months the house is listed on the market, the listing 
company fixed effects, and the city and sold quarter interaction term fixed effects, 
respectively. 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the error terms of the houses 𝑖 located in city 𝑐 at time 𝑡. 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑎  is 
the asking price of the house and 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑏  is the base price as the fair value of the house. 
 
5. Data and Statistics Summary 
Montreal is a multinational city which consists of 31ethnic origins, 23 languages 
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(Canada Census, 2006) 1 , and more than six religions (Canada Census, 2011) 2 . The 
multinational buyers in Montreal express various prospects regarding the perceived value 
of the houses. We obtained an account from a real estate broker to access the database on 
the official website of the Greater Montréal Real Estate Board. We manually collected 
30,551 observations of single-family houses that listed and sold through the real estate 
agents in the city of Montreal from January 1st, 2011 to December 31st, 2016. In order to 
ensure arm’s-length transactions, we exclude transactions with a selling price lower than 
$10,000. Because some transactions have missing variables in the hedonic regression 
model to get the predicted selling price, which is the key variable in our main regressions, 
our final sample consists of 22,021 observations. 
Table 1 summarizes the number of closed transactions at a different asking price 
relative to the reference price level of the entire sample, in cold markets and in hot markets. 
The reference prices we use to classify the asking price level are the predicted selling price 
in Panel A, the average asking price in Panel B, and the average selling price in Panel C, 
respectively. In addition, Figures 1 to 3 illustrate the distributions of the closed transactions 
with reference to the original asking price for each price level in the entire sample. 
Panel A in Table 1 shows that most of the sellers ask a price higher than the 
predicted value as the percentage of “overpriced” houses is nearly double the percentage 
of “underpriced” houses in all markets during our sample period. Furthermore, around 50% 
of houses were sold at the asking price, either the original asking price or the last asking 
price, in a range between 5% and 50% over their expected selling price. For example, the 
number of transactions at the original asking price that sold at 5%–50% above their 
predicted selling price is 50.19% (=(4,925+3,205+2,876)/21,930) of the total number of 
                                                     
1 It is noted that the 2006 Canada Census result is given by and taken from the official website of the Canadian Statistics. 
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/index-eng.cfm 




transactions in the entire sample.  
Moreover, the ratio of the overpriced houses in cold markets is greater than the 
ratio in hot markets: 55.86% (=(2,805+1,856+1,619+429+69)/12,137 based on the original 
asking price) to 50.24% (=(2,708+1,662+1,327+336+51)/12,110 based on the last asking 
price) in cold markets versus 51.25% (=(546+367+334+110+15)/2,677 based on the 
original asking price) to 47.23% (=(533+323+301+96+9)/2,672 based on the last asking 
price) in hot markets. This finding demonstrates that the sellers, who are subject to loss 
aversion, are more likely to ask for a high price relative to the estimated sale price in a cold 
market compared with the sellers in a hot market. Consistently, Panel A and Panel B in 
Figure 1 show that the distribution of the closed transactions is skewed to the overpricing 
side. 
Panel B in Table 1, together with Figure 2, Panel A and Panel B, support that the 
low-price strategy is commonly used in all markets. In both the entire sample and the two 
separate markets, more than 60% (cf. Figure 2, Panel B) of the sellers set the asking price 
lower than the average asking price1 of the same region in the same month, and almost 
one-third (cf. Figure 2, Panel A) of sellers asked for 25% less than the average asking price. 
In addition, the low-price strategy is more widely used in cold markets than in hot markets 
because the ratio of underpriced houses, measured using the regional average asking price, 
to the total number of transactions in cold markets is larger than the ratio in hot markets. 
For example, the ratio in cold markets, which is 64.68% (=(5,418+2,853+2,364)/16,442) 
to 67.40% (=(5,902+2,880+2,339)/16,500), is slightly higher, 3% (64.68%-61.06%) to 4% 
(67.40%-63.24%) higher, than the ratio in hot markets, 61.06% ((1,004+580+511)/3,431) 
to 63.24% ((1,074+590+516)/3,447). Moreover, Figure 2, Panels A and B show that the 
distribution of the closed transactions is skewed to the underpricing side with reference to 
                                                     
1 It is noted that the average asking price is given by and taken from the official website of the Greater Montréal Real 
Estate Board. http://www.cigm.qc.ca. 
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the regional average asking price. Panel A in Table A1 (Appendix), based on the regional 
median asking price as the reference price, shows the same pattern. 
Rather than using the regional average asking price as the reference price, Panel A 
of Figure 3 shows that the number of sellers whose asking price for their house was lower 
than the regional average selling price is almost identical to the number of sellers whose 
asking price was higher than the regional average selling price. Figure 3, Panel B indicates 
that the number of the closed transactions is equally distributed around the fair-pricing 
range with reference to the regional average selling price. Panel B in Table A1 (Appendix) 
shows that using the regional median selling price as the reference price results in the same 
pattern as using the regional average selling price as the reference price. 
Table 2 summarizes the mean and standard deviation of the key parameters for the 
main analysis in the entire sample, and in both cold markets and the hot markets separately. 
The last column illustrates the differences of the means in buyer’s and seller’s markets and 
the P-value for each difference. Numbers in brackets represent the standard deviation of 
each mean and the P-value of each difference. 
Part A in Table 2 shows that the selling price per square foot in cold markets is 
$7.543 lower, on average, at a 10% significance level. But, an average transaction was 
listed one month longer during cold markets. The difference is significant at 1%. Even 
though the average selling price per unit in cold markets is higher than the average selling 
price in hot markets, this is because housing supply in different real estate markets is of 
different quality. For example, the average floor size of houses sold in a cold market is 
significantly larger than the average floor size of houses sold in a hot market.  
Panel A and Panel B in Table 2 indicate that the houses sold are overvalued (based 
on the predicted selling price) in both cold markets and the hot markets. The means of the 
selling prices, which are 504.594 (000) and 472.635 (000) in each market, are higher than 
the means of the predicted selling price in each market, which are 472.919 (000) and 
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452.329 (000), respectively. 
In sum, in our entire sample, the sellers tend to set the asking price above the 
predicted value but below the average asking price. In addition, they tend to refer to the 
average selling price as the fair value and list their houses with the price in a range close 
to the fair value: 25% below and above the region’s average selling price. In the following 
section, we will examine whether and how asking prices affect the final sale price. We 
separately apply difference reference points to asking prices, including the predicted selling 
price, regional average asking and median asking prices, and regional average selling and 
median selling prices. We examine the efficiency of the two main listing price strategies: 
the low-price strategy supported by the auction behavior theory, and the high-price strategy, 
backed by the anchor effect theory. 
 
6. Results and Discussion 
6.1. Hedonic Regression Model 
Table 3 indicates that the final prices of the single-family houses are statistically 
significantly and positively correlated with property features such as the floor size, the lot 
area, the number of rooms, the number of bedrooms and bedrooms in the basement, the 
number of bathrooms and powder rooms, the number of garages and driveways, and the 
dummies of the air conditioner, the fireplace, and the swimming pool. However, a house’s 
selling price is negatively affected by its age at a significance level of 1% and has no 
significant relationship with the number of carports in the house. Moreover, coefficients of 
year fixed effects (unreported) demonstrate that during our sample period, the houses sold 
in 2016 have the highest selling price but the houses sold in 2011 have the lowest selling 
price, which is probably explained by the recovery of the real estate market. Coefficients 
of month fixed effects suggest that houses sold in March, April, and May achieve 
comparatively high selling prices, very likely because the summer in Montreal is the 
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moving season for the year. According to the adjusted R-squared, our hedonic model 
explains 84.21% of the houses’ selling prices in our sample. 
6.2 The Anchoring Effect of the Asking Price in the Whole Market 
We begin to analyze the efficiency of the listing strategies in Table 4 by assuming 
that the predicted selling price correctly measures the fair value of the house. As shown in 
Columns 1 and 2, which focus on the original asking price and the last asking price, 
respectively, the log of the selling price increases with the log of the predicted selling price. 
In addition, for each unit of increase in the predicted selling price, the overvalued houses 
gain additional increases in the selling price compared to the fair valued houses. Column 1 
indicates that a house that is listed at a price 5%–15% higher than the expected selling price 
will command an additional increase of 0.07% (=0.007×10%) in the sale price for each 
10% increase in the expected selling price. The increase of 0.07% could be converted to an 
additional increase of $351 (=0.07%×$501,388) above the mean selling price ($501,388) 
of our entire sample. Similarly, for houses priced 15% to 25% above their predicted selling 
price, an additional increase of 0.13% (i.e., a dollar amount of $652) in the selling price is 
generated by overpricing for each 10% increase in the expected selling price. For the 
houses listed 25% to 50%, 50% to 100%, and more than 100% over their predicted selling 
price, there are additional increases of 0.22% ($1,103), 0.36% ($1,805), and 0.58% ($2,908) 
in the selling prices, respectively, for each 10% increase in the predicted selling price. In 
addition, the coefficients of overpricing dummies indicate that the higher the asking price 
level, the higher the increase in the selling price. 
Column 2, based on the last asking price, illustrates the same results as Column 1 
except for the asking price level of over 200% of the predicted selling price. For each 10% 
increase in the expected selling price, the additional benefit generated by overpricing the 
house by 100% or more through the last asking price is 0.62%, which is greater than 0.58%, 
the additional increase gained by overpricing the original asking price at the same price 
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level in Column 1. In general, both the original asking price and the last asking price show 
the same pattern; therefore, we focus on analyzing the original asking price columns in the 
following section. 
In contrast, the coefficients of the underpricing dummies in Columns 1 and 2 
demonstrate that for each unit of increase in the predicted selling price, the undervalued 
houses experience less increase in the selling price than do the fair valued houses. Column1 
indicates that for houses priced 5%–15% below their predicted selling prices, a smaller 
increase of 0.08% (i.e., $401 in dollars) in the selling price above the mean selling price 
($501,388) of our entire sample is generated by underpricing for each 10% increase in the 
expected selling price. For houses listed between 75% and 85% as well as below 75% of 
the predicted value, there are smaller increases of 0.17% ($852) and 0.30% ($1,504) from 
each 10% increase in the predicted selling price. Moreover, the decrease in the negative 
coefficients with the decreasing of the asking price level shows that the lower the asking 
price level, the less the increase in selling price for each unit increase in the predicted 
selling price.  
The underpricing dummies in both Column 1 and Column 2 reject the efficiency of 
the low-price strategy, which proposes that a low price generates a high selling price. For 
undervalued houses, smaller increases in the selling price are generated by underpricing 
for each unit increase in the predicted selling price, which is opposed to the theory proposed 
by the low-price strategy. Furthermore, the lower the asking price, the lower the 
incremental gain in the selling price. The overpricing dummies in Column 1 and Column 
2 support the anchor effect of the asking price, indicating that a high asking price generates 
a high selling price. For overvalued houses, additional increases are generated by 
overpricing for each increase in the predicted selling price, which is consistent with the 
theory proposed by the high-price strategy. In addition, the higher the asking price level, 
the greater the extra increase in the selling price.  
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In the real estate market, even well-educated real estate agents seldom use the 
hedonic model to measure the fair price of houses. Instead, most sellers and their 
professional real estate brokers prefer to simply use the regional average or median asking 
prices as reference prices because they believe those asking prices reflect the asking price 
levels of their competitors. Moreover, they would like to use the regional average or median 
selling prices as reference values because they consider those selling prices to be a 
reflection of the recent real estate market situation and the buyers’ bargaining power.  
Columns 3 and 4 and Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4, which are based on the regional 
average asking price and the regional average selling price as the reference price, 
respectively, demonstrate the same results, which support the high-price strategy reject the 
low-price strategy. Compared with the anchor effect in Columns 1 and 2, Columns 3 and 4 
and Columns 5 and 6 illustrate smaller additional increases in the selling price for each 
increase in the expected selling price. Column 3 indicates that for houses priced 5%–15%, 
15%–25%, 25%–50%, 50%–100%, and 100% or more above the regional average asking 
price, extra increases of 0.06% ($300), 0.10% ($501), 0.15% ($752), 0.27% ($1,354), and 
0.45% ($2,256), respectively, are generated by overpricing for each 10% increase in the 
predicted selling price.  
In sum, Table 4 illustrates that overpricing and underpricing the house relative to the 
predicted selling price, regional average asking price, and regional average selling price 
introduce opposing effects on the selling price. The coefficients of overpricing dummies 
are all significantly positive, but the coefficients of underpricing dummies are all 
significantly negative.  
The columns in Table A2 (Appendix) indicate that for houses with asking prices set 
with reference to the regional average asking price and median asking price or to the 
regional average selling price and median selling price, the same extra increases in the 
selling price are generated by overpricing for each unit increase in the predicted selling 
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price. The coefficients for both the overpricing dummies and the underpricing dummies 
are similar among those four reference prices. 
Furthermore, for houses with asking prices set with reference to the predicted 
selling price, the total increase (increases generated by the predicted selling price plus 
additional increases generated by overpricing) in the selling price is the largest for each 
unit increase in the expected selling price. Column 1 in Table 4 shows that for houses priced 
at 5%–15%, 15%–25%, 25%–50%, 50%–100%, and 100% or more over the predicted 
selling price, total increases of 10.05% (=0.998×10%+0.007×10%, $50,389), 10.11% 
($50,690), 10.20% ($51,142), 10.34% ($51,844), and 10.56% ($52,947), respectively, are 
generated for each 10% increase in the predicted selling price.  
6.3 The Pricing Strategies in Cold and Hot Markets.   
Column 1 and Column 2 in Table 5 replicate regressions in Table 4 for transactions in 
cold markets and in hot markets separately. Coefficients of both the underpricing dummies 
and the overpricing dummies in cold markets and in hot markets show the same pattern as 
the coefficients of the entire sample. The negative coefficients for the underpricing 
dummies confirm that the low-price strategy is not effective, even in a hot market where 
the sellers have more bargaining power over the buyers; asking for low prices cannot lead 
to a bidding war and push up the selling prices.  
Column 2 shows that for houses priced 25% or more below the expected selling 
price, a 0.29% ($1,454) smaller increase is generated by underpricing for each 10% 
increase in the predicted selling price. The houses priced at 15%–25% and 5%–15% below 
the predicted selling price are subject to 0.16%–0.08% smaller increases in the selling price 
for each 10% increase in the predicted selling price.  
Columns 3, 6, and 9 in Table 5 explain the difference for the coefficients of each 
parameter in a cold market versus a hot market.  
Column 6 shows that, at most asking price levels, the additional increases in the 
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selling price driven by each unit of increase in the predicted selling price have no 
significant difference in cold or hot markets. When sellers initially ask for a price 25% or 
lower than the regional average asking price, houses have significantly smaller increases: 
0.03% ($150) smaller increases in a cold market than in a hot one. Column 3 in Table A3 
(Appendix), which uses the regional median asking price as its reference point, shows the 
same pattern as Column 6 in Table 5.  
However, Column 3 and Column 9 in Table 5 and Column 6 in Table A3 indicate 
that for houses with asking prices set with reference to the predicted selling price and the 
regional average (median) selling price, the coefficients of the underpricing dummies and 
the overpricing dummies in both markets have no significant difference, revealing that the 
anchor effects in both markets are similar. Since the quality of houses supplied in cold 
markets and in hot markets are different, setting the asking price with reference to the 
regional average asking price causes a difference in the asking price’s anchor effect. 
Because higher prices are asked for the same quality houses in a hot market, the regional 
average asking prices are pushed higher in a hot market, and because the seller has less 
bargaining power in a cold market, the penalty (less increase in selling price) for 
underpricing is greater in a cold market. Nevertheless, a house’s predicted selling price, 
reflecting the true value of the house based on its property features, seldom changes in a 
cold market versus in a hot market. The regional average selling price, which reflects the 
realistic real estate market, has already absorbed the difference between the cold and the 
hot markets. As a result, in general, the asking price’s anchor effect does not differ in a cold 
market versus in a hot market.  
 
7. Robustness 
The results outlined above show that the higher the asking price, no matter the 
original asking price or the last asking price, the higher the final selling price, which is 
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supported by the anchor effect of the asking price. However, houses with a higher sale price 
could simply have higher quality, especially higher unobservable quality, which we do not 
include in our previous regressions. In order to check the robustness of the high-price 
strategy, we use the repeat-sale data within our sample period to re-run the regressions, 
including the residual from the previous sale transaction as the house’s unobservable 
quality. Between January 1st, 2011 and December 31st, 2016, we have a total of 1,362 pairs 
of usable repeat-sales data points. Because the repeat-sales data are very scant compared 
to the full sample size, 1,362 versus 22,021, we do not use the repeat-sales data in our main 
regressions. 
𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
ℎ + 𝛽2 × 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑝 + 𝛾𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
ℎ
× 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛿𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑡
ℎ × 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑙
+ 𝐹𝑐𝑞 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡                                          (3) 
where 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑝 is the residual term from the previous sale of the house, calculating by 
the previous final sale price minus the predicted selling price of the house at the month of 
the previous sale transaction. Other variables in equation (3) are defined in the same way 
as the variables in equation (2). 
Results from the testing regressions show that no matter which reference price a 
house is set at, the unobservable quality a has significant positive effect on the selling price, 
pointing out that the unobservable quality is perceived by the buyers and reflected in the 
final sale price.  
Most importantly, the results in Table 6 are consistent with our previous finding 
that asking prices are relevant to the final sale price. The negative coefficients of the 
underpricing dummies in the first two columns indicate that there is no evidence for auction 
behavior or herding behavior, which generate a bidding war and push up the final sale price. 
The positive coefficients of the overpricing dummies indicate that the high-price strategy 
is effective because, for overpriced houses, additional increases are generated by 
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overpricing for each unit of increase in the predicted selling price. 
In addition, controlling for the unobservable quality, the higher the asking price 
level, the higher the additional increases for each unit of increase in the expected value. 
Column 1 in Table 6 reveals that for houses priced at 5%–15%, 15%–25%, 25%–50%, 
50%–100%, and more than 100% over the predicted selling price, additional increases of 
0.06% (0.006×10%), 0.12%, 0.21%, 0.33%, and 0.52%, respectively, are generated by 
overpricing for each 10% increase in the predicted selling price. Furthermore, comparing 
columns in Table 6 and Table 4, the coefficients for each overpricing dummy in Table 6 are 
comparatively less than the coefficients in Table 4, indicating that in the previous 
regression, part of the additional increases is from the unobservable quality. However, the 
significant positive coefficients for all the overpricing dummies, after controlling for the 
unobservable quality, confirm the existence of the asking price’s anchor effect. In sum, 
coefficients in all columns in Table 6 reject the viability of the low-price strategy and 
confirm the effectiveness of the high-price strategy. 
Next, we compare different asking price strategies in cold and hot markets, 
controlling for the house’s unobservable quality. The coefficients of the underpricing 
dummies and overpricing dummies in cold markets show a pattern similar to the 
coefficients in the entire sample. However, in hot markets, we do not have significant 
evidence to prove the efficiency of either the low-price strategy or the high-price strategy 
because we have limited observations—only 130 observations, in hot markets.  
The robustness tests raise no concerns about the effectiveness of the high-price 
strategy and the existence of the asking price’s anchor effect in the entire sample and in 
cold markets. However, in further study regarding the anchor effect of the asking price in 
hot markets and the different anchor effects in cold versus hot markets, we need to either 




8. Conclusion and Discussion 
An effective listing price strategy assists the seller in reaching a higher selling price. 
We analyzed the single-family transaction data in Montreal in recent years. Our main 
regression results suggest that buyers anchor to the asking price offered by the sellers. The 
higher the asking price level, the higher the anchor effect of the asking price. This finding 
is robust to different proxies for reference points, model specifications and subsamples.  
By comparing cold and hot markets, we examined the effect of setting asking 
prices relative to difference reference prices. For houses priced 25% or more less than the 
regional average (median) asking price, smaller increases in the selling price are generated 
by underpricing in the cold markets than in hot markets. However, for houses with asking 
prices set with reference to the predicted selling price and the regional average selling price, 
the coefficients for both the underpricing dummies and the overpricing dummies are almost 
identical in both markets.  
After including the unobservable quality in our main regressions, we confirmed 
the robustness of the asking price’s anchor effect on the selling price and the effectiveness 
of the high-price strategy. However, due to the limited repeat-sales data in our sample, we 
have insufficient evidence to support the difference in the asking price’s anchor effect in 
cold versus in hot markets. For further research, we would either extend our sample period 
or include more cities in our sample to get more repeat-sales data. 
We support the high-price strategy and reject the low-price strategy in the housing 
market by analyzing the recent Montreal data. We believe the high-price strategy is 
effective in a typical market. Likewise, the sample used in this study, the real estate market 
in Montreal between 2011 and 2016, is considered normal: without super cold or extremely 
hot market such as Hong-Kong, Vancouver, and Peking, in which the MOI is extremely 
close to one and the final sale price highly exceeds its initial asking price. In the future 
study, we would examine the effectiveness of the high-price strategy and the low-price 
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strategy in the super-hot markets, such as in Hong-Kong, Vancouver, and Peking. 
Nevertheless, we expect the high-price strategy is still effective in those markets because 
in an extremely hot market, the imbalance between supply and demand makes a low price 
strategy unnecessary and unattractive. Therefore, a high asking price still attracts more 
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Table 1 No. of Transactions and Sample Distribution 
Panel A documents the number of transaction for each asking price level referring to the predicted selling price. Panel B documents the number of transaction 
for each asking price level referring to the regional average asking price, which is the average asking price in the region where the house located and at the 
time when the house was listed on the market. Panel C documents the number of transaction for each asking price level referring to the regional average 
selling price, which is the average selling price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the market. Columns 
“Original” indicate that the asking price levels are classified by the ratio of the original asking price to the reference price; Columns “Last” indicate that the 
asking price levels are classified by the ratio of the last asking price to the reference price. We classify our entire sample by using the month on inventory 
(MOI), which is the ratio of the number of active listings to the number of sales transactions in each municipality in a certain month. A hot market (seller’s 
market) is defined as MOI under 4 months; a balanced market is defined as MOI between 4 to 6 months; a cold market (buyer’s market) is defined if MOI 
is over 6 months. 
  Entire Sample Cold Market Hot Market 
  Obs. Obs. Obs. 
 Original Last Original Last Original Last 
Panel A: Reference Price: Predicted Selling Price 
Asking price below 75% of 
predicted selling price 
636 771 324 406 77 85 
Asking price 75%–85% of 
predicted selling price 
1,297 1,588 664 838 170 206 
Asking price 85%–95% of 
predicted selling price 
3,173 3,560 1,696 1,929 434 455 
Asking price 95%–105% of 
predicted selling price 
4,862 5,182 2,675 2,853 624 664 
Asking price 105%–115% of 
predicted selling price 
4,925 4,711 2,805 2,708 546 533 
Asking price 115%–125% of 
predicted selling price 
3,205 2,894 1,856 1,662 367 323 
Asking price 125%–150% of 
predicted selling price 
2,876 2,416 1,619 1,327 334 301 
Asking price 150%–200% of 
predicted selling price 
814 670 429 336 110 96 
Asking price above 200% of 
predicted selling price 
142 100 69 51 15 9 
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Table 1 No. of Transactions and Sample Distribution 
Panel A documents the number of transaction for each asking price level referring to the predicted selling price. Panel B documents the number of transaction 
for each asking price level referring to the regional average asking price, which is the average asking price in the region where the house located and at the 
time when the house was listed on the market. Panel C documents the number of transaction for each asking price level referring to the regional average 
selling price, which is the average selling price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the market. Columns 
“Original” indicate that the asking price levels are classified by the ratio of the original asking price to the reference price; Columns “Last” indicate that the 
asking price levels are classified by the ratio of the last asking price to the reference price. We classify our entire sample by using the month on inventory 
(MOI), which is the ratio of the number of active listings to the number of sales transactions in each municipality in a certain month. A hot market (seller’s 
market) is defined as MOI under 4 months; a balanced market is defined as MOI between 4 to 6 months; a cold market (buyer’s market) is defined if MOI 
is over 6 months. 
  Entire Sample Cold Market Hot Market 
  Obs. Obs. Obs. 
 Original Last Original Last Original Last 
Panel B: Reference Price: Regional Average Asking Price 
Asking price below 75% of 
average asking price 
9,371 10,185 5,418 5,902 1,004 1,074 
Asking price 75%–85% of average 
asking price 
5,087 5,128 2,853 2,880 580 590 
Asking price 85%–95% of average 
asking price 
4,212 4,168 2,364 2,339 511 516 
Asking price 95%–105% of 
average asking price 
3,235 3,056 1,797 1,667 400 378 
Asking price 105%–115% of 
average asking price 
2,135 2,029 1,149 1,094 263 257 
Asking price 115%–125% of 
average asking price 
1,459 1,381 769 744 203 190 
Asking price 125%–150% of 
average asking price 
1,939 1,758 1,045 934 265 245 
Asking price 150%–200% of 
average asking price 
1,267 1,221 693 654 156 158 
Asking price above 200% of 
average asking price 
615 504 354 286 49 39 
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Table 1 No. of Transactions and Sample Distribution 
Panel A documents the number of transaction for each asking price level referring to the predicted selling price. Panel B documents the number of transaction 
for each asking price level referring to the regional average asking price, which is the average asking price in the region where the house located and at the 
time when the house was listed on the market. Panel C documents the number of transaction for each asking price level referring to the regional average 
selling price, which is the average selling price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the market. Columns 
“Original” indicate that the asking price levels are classified by the ratio of the original asking price to the reference price; Columns “Last” indicate that the 
asking price levels are classified by the ratio of the last asking price to the reference price. We classify our entire sample by using the month on inventory 
(MOI), which is the ratio of the number of active listings to the number of sales transactions in each municipality in a certain month. A hot market (seller’s 
market) is defined as MOI under 4 months; a balanced market is defined as MOI between 4 to 6 months; a cold market (buyer’s market) is defined if MOI 
is over 6 months. 
  Entire Sample Cold Market Hot Market 
  Obs. Obs. Obs. 
 Original Last Original Last Original Last 
Panel C: Reference Price: Regional Average Selling Price 
Asking price below 75% of 
average selling price 
4,751 5,232 2,686 2,992 504 537 
Asking price 75%–85% of average 
selling price 
3,778 4,036 2,088 2,234 454 497 
Asking price 85%–95% of average 
selling price 
4,297 4,385 2,411 2,450 529 525 
Asking price 95%–105% of 
average selling price 
4,024 4,004 2,280 2,250 508 517 
Asking price 105%–115% of 
average selling price 
3,106 3,054 1,710 1,724 366 350 
Asking price 115%–125% of 
average selling price 
2,320 2,150 1,333 1,203 268 261 
Asking price 125%–150% of 
average selling price 
3,400 3,182 1,856 1,739 424 404 
Asking price 150%–200% of 
average selling price 
2,261 2,142 1,289 1,210 256 246 
Asking price above 200% of 
average selling price 
1,289 1,154 751 663 104 95 









Table 2 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 summarizes the mean and the standard deviation of the key variables in the entire sample, in the cold market, and in the hot market, respectively. C-H 
column documents the difference between the mean in the cold market and the mean in the hot market. The number in the bracket under the mean is the standard 
deviation of each mean, and the number in the bracket under the difference is the P-value of each difference. The significance of the difference as determined by a 
two-tailed t-test (sign test) is highlight with * for 10% significance level, ** for 5% significance level, *** for 1% significance level. 
  Entire Sample Cold Market Hot Market C-H 
  Obs. Mean(SD) Obs. Mean(SD) Obs. Mean(SD) Diff (P) 
























































         




















         






















         




















         






Table 3 Hedonic Regression Model 
Table 3 illustrates the estimated coefficients of equation (1), and the P-value of each coefficient. Dummy: Forced Air is the dummy variable for the air 
conditioner system: Dummy: Forced Air equals to 1 if the house has a central air conditioner system, and equals to 0 if otherwise. Dummy: Fireplace is 
equal to 1 if the house has a fireplace, and equals to 0 if otherwise. Dummy: Swimming Pool is equal to 1 if the house has a swimming pool, and equals to 
0 if otherwise. We control five building types: Attached, Attached corner unit, Semi-detached, Detached, and Quadrex, respectively, the five property types: 
Bungalow, Mobile home, One-and-a-half storey, Two or more storey, and Split level, respectively. The numbers in the parentheses indicate number of 
categories controlled by fixed effects. * for 10% significance level, ** for 5% significance level, *** for 1% significance level. 
 Dependent Variable: Ln Selling Price 
 Coefficient P-value 
Intercept 13.2667*** 0.000 
Floor Size 0.0001*** 0.000 
Lot Area 0.0001*** 0.000 
House Age -0.0024*** 0.000 
No. of Rooms 0.0138*** 0.000 
No. of Bedrooms 0.0331*** 0.000 
No. of Bedrooms in the Basement 0.0134*** 0.000 
No. of Bathrooms 0.1366*** 0.000 
No. of Powder Rooms 0.0839*** 0.000 
No. of Garage 0.0725*** 0.000 
No. of Carport -0.0026 0.674 
No. of Driveway 0.0076*** 0.000 
Dummy: Forced Air 0.0307*** 0.000 
Dummy: Fireplace 0.0683*** 0.000 
Dummy: Swimming Pool 0.0624*** 0.000 
Building Type Fixed Effect Yes (5)  
Property Type Fixed Effect Yes (5)  
Municipal Fixed Effect  Yes (34)  
Year Fixed Effect Yes (6)  
Month Fixed Effect Yes (12)  
Observations 22,021  
Adjusted R-squared 0.8421  










Table 4 The Effect of Asking Price on Final Sale Price 
In Table 4, the dependent variable is log of selling price. Column (1) and (2) document the estimated coefficients of equation (2) when the reference price for the asking 
price is the predicted selling price, Column (1) focuses on the original asking price and Column (2) focuses on the last asking price. Column (3) and (4) document the 
estimated coefficients of equation (2) when the reference price for the asking price is the original average asking price, which is the average asking price in the region where 
the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the market. Column (5) and (6) document the estimated coefficients of equation (2) when the reference price 
for the asking price is the original average selling price, which is the average selling price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed 
on the market. We control the listing office and the interaction term of the quarter and the municipal. The number in the bracket indicates the P-value. * for 10% significance 
level, ** for 5% significance level, *** for 1% significance level. 
 Dependent Variable: Ln Selling Price 
 Predicted Selling Price Average Asking Price Average Selling Price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Original Last Original Last Original Last 


































































































































Listing Office Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter and Municipal 
Interaction Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,021 22,021 22,021 22,021 22,021 22,021 





Table 5 The Effect of Asking Price on Final Sale Price in the Cold Market and in the Hot Market 
In Table 5, the dependent variable is log of selling price. Column (1) and (2) document the estimated coefficients of equation (2) when the reference price for the original 
asking price is the predicted selling price, Column (1) focuses on the closed transaction in the cold market and Column (2) focuses on the closed transaction in the hot 
market. Column (3) indicates the difference of coefficients between Columns (1) and (2). Column (4) and (5) document the estimated coefficients of equation (2) when the 
reference price for the original asking price is the regional average asking price. Column (6) indicates the difference of coefficients between Columns (4) and (5). Column 
(7) and (8) document the estimated coefficients of equation (2) when the reference price for the original asking price is the regional average selling price. Column (9) 
indicates the difference of coefficients between Columns (7) and (8). We control the listing office and the interaction term of the quarter and the municipal. The number in 
the bracket indicates the P-value. * for 10% significance level, ** for 5% significance level, *** for 1% significance level. 
 Dependent variable: Ln Selling Price 
 Predicted Selling Price Average Asking Price Average Selling Price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Cold Mkt Hot Mkt C-H Cold Mkt Hot Mkt C-H Cold Mkt Hot Mkt C-H 






























































































































































































Listing Office Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Quarter and Municipal 
Interaction Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Observations 12,184 2,689  12,184 2,689  12,184 2,689  




Table 6 Robustness Tests for the Unobservable Quality 
In Table 6, the dependent variable is log of selling price. Column (1) and (2) document the estimated coefficients of equation (3) when the reference price for the asking 
price is the predicted selling price, Column (1) focuses on the original asking price and Column (2) focuses on the last asking price. Column (3) and (4) document the 
estimated coefficients of equation (3) when the reference price for the asking price is the original average asking price, which is the average asking price in the region where 
the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the market. Column (5) and (6) document the estimated coefficients of equation (3) when the reference price 
for the asking price is the original average selling price, which is the average selling price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed 
on the market. Unobservable Quality is defined as the residual term from the previous transaction, which is the difference between the previous sale price and the predicted 
selling price of the house at the time of the previous transaction. We control the listing office and the interaction term of the quarter and the municipal. The number in the 
bracket indicates the P-value. * for 10% significance level, ** for 5% significance level, *** for 1% significance level. 
 Dependent variable: Ln Selling Price 
 Predicted Selling Price Average Asking Price Average Selling Price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Original Last Original Last Original Last 
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Table 6 Robustness Tests for the Unobservable Quality 
In Table 6, the dependent variable is log of selling price. Column (1) and (2) document the estimated coefficients of equation (3) when the reference price for the asking 
price is the predicted selling price, Column (1) focuses on the original asking price and Column (2) focuses on the last asking price. Column (3) and (4) document the 
estimated coefficients of equation (3) when the reference price for the asking price is the original average asking price, which is the average asking price in the region where 
the house located and at the time when the house starts to be listed on the market. Column (5) and (6) document the estimated coefficients of equation (3) when the reference 
price for the asking price is the original average selling price, which is the average selling price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house starts 
to be listed on the market. Unobservable Quality is defined as the residual term from the previous transaction, which is the difference between the previous sale price and 
the predicted selling price of the house at the time of the previous transaction. We control the listing office and the interaction term of the quarter and the municipal. The 
number in the bracket indicates the P-value. * for 10% significance level, ** for 5% significance level, *** for 1% significance level. 
 Dependent variable: Ln Selling Price 
 Predicted Selling Price Average Asking Price Average Selling Price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Original Last Original Last Original Last 
Listing Office Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter and Municipal 
Interaction Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,362 1,362 1,362 1,362 1,362 1,362 
























Figure 1, Panel A. 
Sample Distribution by Asking Price / Predicted Selling Price 
We use the first column data (“Entire sample”) in Panel A, Table 1 to draw this figure. In Panel A, Figure 1, the number on the X-Axis documents each asking price 
level, which classified by the ratio of the original asking price to the predicted selling price. The number on the Y-Axis documents the percentage of the number of 
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Figure 1, Panel B. 
Sample Distribution of Underpricing (Low-price), Fair Pricing and Overpricing (High-
Price) (Referring to the Predicted Selling Price) 
We use the first column data (“Entire sample”) in Panel A, Table 1 to draw this figure. In Panel A, Figure1, the number on the X-Axis documents whether the house is 
fair priced, overpriced, or underpriced, determined by the ratio of the original asking price to the predicted selling price. We define the house is fair priced when the 
ratio of the original asking price to the predicted selling price is between 0.95 and 1.05; the house is overpriced when the ratio of the original asking price to the 
predicted selling price is above 1.05; the house is underpriced when the ratio of the original asking price to the predicted selling price is under 0.95. The number on the 
Y-Axis documents the percentage of the number of transaction in each asking price level, which is the number of the closed transaction in each asking price level divide 










Underpricing <0.95 Fairpricing 0.95-1.05 Overpricing >1.05
Asking price / Predicted selling price





Figure 2, Panel A. 
Sample Distribution by Asking Price / Regional Average Asking Price 
We use the first column data (“Entire sample”) in Panel B, Table 1 to draw this figure. In Panel B, Figure 2, the number on the X-Axis documents each asking price 
level, which classified by the ratio of the original asking price to the regional average asking price, which is the average asking price in the region where the house 
located and at the time when the house starts to be listed on the market. The number on the Y-Axis documents the percentage of the number of transaction in each 
asking price level, which is the number of the closed transaction in each asking price level divide the total number of transactions. We define the house is fair priced 
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Figure 2, Panel B. 
Sample Distribution of Underpricing (Low-price), Fair Pricing and Overpricing (High-
Price) (Referring to the Regional Average Asking Price) 
We use the first column data (“Entire sample”) in Panel B, Table 1 to draw this figure. In Panel B, Figure2, the number on the X-Axis documents whether the house is 
fair priced, overpriced, or underpriced, determined by the ratio of the original asking price to the regional average asking price, which is the average asking price in the 
region where the house located and at the time when the house starts to be listed on the market. We define the house is fair priced when the ratio of the original asking 
price to the regional average asking price is between 0.95 and 1.05; the house is overpriced when the ratio of the original asking price to the regional average asking 
price is above 1.05; the house is underpriced when the ratio of the original asking price to the regional average asking price is under 0.95. The number on the Y-Axis 
documents the percentage of the number of transaction in each asking price level, which is the number of the closed transaction in each asking price level divide the 
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Figure 3, Panel A. 
Sample Distribution by Asking Price / Regional Average Selling Price 
We use the first column data (“Entire sample”) in Panel C, Table 1 to draw this figure. In Panel C, Figure 3, the number on the X-Axis documents each asking price 
level, which classified by the ratio of the original asking price to the regional average selling price, which is the average selling price in the region where the house 
located and at the time when the house starts to be listed on the market. The number on the Y-Axis documents the percentage of the number of transaction in each 
asking price level, which is the number of the closed transaction in each asking price level divide the total number of transactions. We define the house is fair priced 
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Figure 3, Panel B. 
Sample Distribution of Underpricing (Low-price), Fair Pricing and Overpricing (High-
Price) (Referring to the Regional Average Selling Price) 
We use the first column data (“Entire sample”) in Panel C, Table 1 to draw this figure. In Panel C, Figure2, the number on the X-Axis documents whether the house is 
fair priced, overpriced, or underpriced, determined by the ratio of the original asking price to the regional average selling price, which is the average selling price in 
the region where the house located and at the time when the house starts to be listed on the market. We define the house is fair priced when the ratio of the original 
asking price to the regional average selling price is between 0.95 and 1.05; the house is overpriced when the ratio of the original asking price to the regional average 
selling price is above 1.05; the house is underpriced when the ratio of the original asking price to the regional average selling price is under 0.95. The number on the 
Y-Axis documents the percentage of the number of transaction in each asking price level, which is the number of the closed transaction in each asking price level divide 
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Table A1 No. of Transactions and Sample Distribution 
Panel A documents the number of transaction for each asking price level referring to the regional median asking price, which is the median asking price in the 
region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the market. Panel B documents the number of transaction for each asking price 
level referring to the regional median selling price, which is the median selling price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was 
listed on the market. Columns “Original” indicate that the asking price levels are classified by the ratio of the original asking price to the reference price; 
Columns “Last” indicate that the asking price levels are classified by the ratio of the last asking price to the reference price. We classify our entire sample by 
using the month on inventory (MOI), which is the ratio of the number of active listings to the number of sales transactions in each municipality in a certain 
month. A hot market (seller’s market) is defined as MOI under 4 months; a balanced market is defined as MOI between 4 to 6 months; a cold market (buyer’s 
market) is defined if MOI is over 6 months. 
  Entire Sample Cold Market Hot Market 
  Obs. Obs. Obs. 
  Original Last Original Last Original Last 
Panel A: Reference price: regional median asking price 
Asking price below 75% of median 
asking price 
4,654 5,169 2,706 2,992 460 498 
Asking price 75%–85% of median 
asking price 
3,928 4,236 2,246 2,234 477 506 
Asking price 85%–95% of median 
asking price 
4,768 4,884 2,710 2,450 568 590 
Asking price 95%–105% of median 
asking price 
5,015 5,047 2,782 2,250 604 606 
Asking price 105%–115% of median 
asking price 
3,112 2,784 1,697 1,724 383 348 
Asking price 115%–125% of median 
asking price 
1,998 1,902 1,105 1,203 240 234 
Asking price 125%–150% of 
median asking price 
2,830 2,619 1,498 1,739 380 358 
Asking price 150%–200% of 
median asking price 
1,890 1,801 1,045 1,210 216 218 
Asking price above 200% of median 
asking price 
1,132 1,001 751 657 104 90 




Table A1 No. of Transactions and Sample Distribution 
Panel A documents the number of transaction for each asking price level referring to the regional median asking price, which is the median asking price in the 
region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the market. Panel B documents the number of transaction for each asking price 
level referring to the regional median selling price, which is the median selling price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was 
listed on the market. Columns “Original” indicate that the asking price levels are classified by the ratio of the original asking price to the reference price; 
Columns “Last” indicate that the asking price levels are classified by the ratio of the last asking price to the reference price. We classify our entire sample by 
using the month on inventory (MOI), which is the ratio of the number of active listings to the number of sales transactions in each municipality in a certain 
month. A hot market (seller’s market) is defined as MOI under 4 months; a balanced market is defined as MOI between 4 to 6 months; a cold market (buyer’s 
market) is defined if MOI is over 6 months. 
  Entire Sample Cold Market Hot Market 
  Obs. Obs. Obs. 
  Original Last Original Last Original Last 
Panel B: Reference price: regional median selling price 
Asking price below 75% of median 
selling price 
3,004 3,327 1,755 1,951 284 313 
Asking price 75%–85% of median 
selling price 
2,717 3,001 1,499 1,688 345 368 
Asking price 85%–95% of median 
selling price 
3,806 4,033 2,154 2,271 448 468 
Asking price 95%–105% of median 
selling price 
4,353 4,390 2,397 2,416 579 592 
Asking price 105%–115% of median 
selling price 
3,711 3,630 2,078 2,041 449 427 
Asking price 115%–125% of median 
selling price 
2,809 2,644 1,584 1,489 318 306 
Asking price 125%–150% of 
median selling price 
4,168 3,973 2,286 2,153 501 487 
Asking price 150%–200% of 
median selling price 
2,950 2,785 1,659 1,557 346 334 
Asking price above 200% of median 
selling price 
1,733 1,579 1,005 908 146 138 
Total 29,251 29,362 16,417 16,474 3,416 3,433 






Table A2 The Effect of Asking Price on Final Sale Price 
In Table A2, the dependent variable is log of selling price. Column (1) and (2) document the estimated coefficients of equation (2) when the reference price for the asking 
price is the regional median asking price, which is the median asking price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the market. 
Column (1) focuses on the original asking price and Column (2) focuses on the last asking price. Column (3) and (4) document the estimated coefficients of equation (2) 
when the reference price for the asking price is the original median selling price, which is the median selling price in the region where the house located and at the time 
when the house was listed on the market. We control the listing office and the interaction term of the quarter and the municipal. The number in the bracket indicates the P-
value. * for 10% significance level, ** for 5% significance level, *** for 1% significance level. 
 Dependent variable: Ln Selling Price 
 Median Asking Price Median Selling Price  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   
 Original Last Original Last   




































































































Listing Office Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Quarter and Municipal 
Interaction Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 22,021 22,021 22,021 22,021   
Adjusted R-squared 0.9260 0.9310 0.9193 0.9244   
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Table A3 The Effect of Asking Price on Final Sale Price in a Cold Market and in a Hot Market 
In Table A3, the dependent variable is log of selling price. Column (1) and (2) document the estimated coefficients of equation (2) when the reference price for the original 
asking price is the regional median asking price, which is the median asking price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the 
market. Column (1) focuses on the closed transaction in the cold market and Column (2) focuses on the closed transaction in the hot market. Column (3) indicates the 
difference of coefficients between Columns (1) and (2). Column (4) and (5) document the estimated coefficients of equation (2) when the reference price for the regional 
median selling price, which is the median selling price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the market. Column (6) indicates 
the difference of coefficients between Columns (4) and (5). We control the listing office and the interaction term of the quarter and the municipal. The number in the bracket 
indicates the P-value. * for 10% significance level, ** for 5% significance level, *** for 1% significance level. 
 Dependent variable: Ln Selling Price 
 Median Asking Price Median Selling Price  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 Cold Mkt Hot Mkt C-H Cold Mkt Hot Mkt C-H    












    














   













   













    













    













   













   













   













   













   
Listing Office Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes     
Quarter and Municipal 
Interaction Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes     
Observations 12,184 2,689  12,184 2,689     




Table A4 Robustness Tests for the Unobservable Quality 
In Table A4, the dependent variable is log of selling price. Column (1) and (2) document the estimated coefficients of equation (3) when the reference price for the asking 
price is the regional median asking price, which is the median asking price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the market. 
Column (1) focuses on the original asking price and Column (2) focuses on the last asking price. Column (3) and (4) document the estimated coefficients of equation (3) 
when the reference price for the asking price is the original median selling price, which is the median selling price in the region where the house located and at the time 
when the house was listed on the market. Unobservable Quality is defined as the residual term from the previous transaction, which is the difference between the previous 
sale price and the predicted selling price of the house at the time of the previous transaction. We control the listing office and the interaction term of the quarter and the 
municipal. The number in the bracket indicates the P-value. * for 10% significance level, ** for 5% significance level, *** for 1% significance level. 
 Dependent variable: Ln Selling Price 
 Median Asking Price Median Selling Price  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   
 Original Last Original Last   
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Table A4 Robustness Tests for the Unobservable Quality 
In Table A4, the dependent variable is log of selling price. Column (1) and (2) document the estimated coefficients of equation (3) when the reference price for the asking 
price is the regional median asking price, which is the median asking price in the region where the house located and at the time when the house was listed on the market. 
Column (1) focuses on the original asking price and Column (2) focuses on the last asking price. Column (3) and (4) document the estimated coefficients of equation (3) 
when the reference price for the asking price is the original median selling price, which is the median selling price in the region where the house located and at the time 
when the house was listed on the market. Unobservable Quality is defined as the residual term from the previous transaction, which is the difference between the previous 
sale price and the predicted selling price of the house at the time of the previous transaction. We control the listing office and the interaction term of the quarter and the 
municipal. The number in the bracket indicates the P-value. * for 10% significance level, ** for 5% significance level, *** for 1% significance level. 
 Dependent variable: Ln Selling Price 
 Median Asking Price Median Selling Price  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   
 Original Last Original Last   
Listing Office Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Quarter and Municipal 
Interaction Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 1,362 1,362 1,362 1,362   
Adjusted R-squared 0.9561 0.9585 0.9504 0.9546   
 
